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I. INTRODUCTION
The historical relationship between juveniles and the judicial system is complex and multi-faceted. Addressing juvenile criminal offenders involves historical trends, social attitudes, biological developments,
Constitutional considerations, and punishment principles. Through the
discourse, a question remains as to juvenile offenders and how they differ from adult offenders. If a difference exists in the cause of crime, the
influence upon action, the understanding of judicial procedure, or the
ability for future improvement, then one could argue that differences
must also exist in the trial and treatment of juvenile offenders. The
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most difficult component is analyzing the differences and then overlaying a legislative procedure that accounts for justice in this regard.
This article evaluates the past and present factors for juveniles in
the judicial system, and then considers the current Idaho legislation
that mandates the transfer of juveniles into adult criminal court when
they are accused of certain, enumerated crimes. Part II examines the
history of juvenile courts and the transfer of offenders out of those
courts. It also highlights the Supreme Court rulings for youth, the rationale and social influence in national trends, and the stance of Idaho
legislation on the topic. Part III argues that Idaho’s mandatory juvenile
transfer laws are bad policy because they contradict the rationale of the
Supreme Court and ignore recent and overwhelming scientific data on
neurobiological development. This article concludes with the recommendation to eliminate the automatic transfer laws and instead impose particularized rules for procedure in which the accused juvenile is granted
counsel, an ability to answer allegations, and an individualized process.
II. HISTORY OF JUVENILE COURTS
A. Origins of Juvenile Courts
A nineteenth century shift in philosophy laid the foundation for the
American juvenile court system.1 As the nation limited the scope of capital punishment, it also reconsidered whether it should treat juveniles
as adults.2 One of the first representations of this reconsideration of juvenile treatment occurred in 1824 in New York, where legislation authorized the court to move criminals into the House of Refuge if they
were under the age of 16.3 The House of Refuge was an establishment
that provided structured rehabilitation for juveniles and thus an alternative to the punishment of incarceration.4 In addition to juveniles who
had committed crimes, the House of Refuge also accepted poor and unfortunate youth, and provided all with education and community
through a regimented schedule.5 As a foundation and justification for its
practice, the House of Refuge and similar programs referenced parens
patriae, a philosophy with origins in the English common law.6 Parens
patriae literally means “parent of his or her country” and generally refers to the capacity of the state to provide protection for individuals un1. Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L.
REV. 1187, 1202 (1970).
2. Lucia B. Whisenand & Edward J. McLaughlin, Completing the Cycle: Reality
and the Juvenile Justice System in New York State, 47 ALB. L. REV. 1, 12 (1982).
3. Id. (citing Act of Mar. 29, 1824, ch. 126, [1824] N.Y. Laws 110). See also, B. K.
PEIRCE, A HALF CENTURY WITH JUVENILE DELINQUENTS; OR THE NEW YORK HOUSE OF
REFUGE AND ITS TIMES 34 (1869).
4. Fox, supra note 1, at 1205.
5. Clifford E. Simonsen, Juvenile Justice in America 301 (3d ed. 1991).
6. See generally Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L. J. 195 (1978).

2016

IGNORING INDIVIDUALISM: HOW A
DISREGARD FOR NEUROSCIENCE AND
SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT MAKES FOR
BAD POLICY IN IDAHO’S MANDATORY
JUVENILE TRANSFER LAW

721

able to care for themselves.7 With beginnings in the feudal system, the
doctrine frequently arose to justify the King’s powers as a guardian, or
his ‘royal prerogative.’8 For example, when a legally insane individual
owned land, parens patriae allowed the King to retain control of the
property to ensure security during the lunatic’s life and proper transfer
upon death.9
Similar to the King providing protection for the insane, American
courts imposed a structure and rehabilitative perspective upon juveniles
through institutions like the House of Refuge. The states were therefore
undertaking a parental role for the protection of these delinquent youth.
However, as the circumstances changed, so too did the methods to provide this protection.10 Originally meant for minor juvenile offenders, the
House of Refuge and other similar establishments began accepting more
serious offenders over time.11 With this changing dynamic, the institutions began a procedure of sending minors to work on rural farms or
other labor-intensive environments until they turned 21.12 Reformers
were critical of this methodology and states sought a more effective
method of providing rehabilitation for juvenile offenders without resorting to incarceration.13
Since the principle of parens patriae came to the United States as a
variation of the English application, it existed as a unique right and decision of each state. After failed institutional procedures, American
courts became involved in the juvenile protection scheme through legislative action.14 In 1899, Illinois became the first state to establish a juvenile court.15 This first court, founded in Cook County, was a result of
Illinois legislation that permitted circuit court judges to hear cases involving “dependent, neglected, and delinquent” children under the age of
16.16 The cases were heard in a specially designated courtroom called
“Juvenile Court.”17 Additionally, these cases involved delinquent, de-

7. Parens patriae, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
8. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972).
9. Custer, supra note 6, at 196.
10. See Thomas J. Bernard & Megan Clouser Kurlychek, The Cycle of Juvenile Justice 65 (2d ed. 1992).
11. Fox, supra note 1, at 1213.
12. Barry Krisberg, The Juvenile Court: Reclaiming the Vision 3 (1988).
13. See BERNARD, supra note 10, at 66.
14. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel., Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600
(1982).
15. See Barry Krisbero & James F. Austin, Reinventing Juvenile Justice 30 (1993).
16. Juvenile Court Act of 1899, 1899 Ill. Laws 131.
17. Id. at § 3.
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pendent, and neglected children.18 Unlike the punitive philosophy of
criminal courts at the time, this Illinois juvenile court sought to investigate, diagnose, and treat the problems, instead of assigning guilt or
blame.19 Thus, the doctrine of parens patriae arose again – this time as
a rationale for juvenile court and state intervention in cases of deviant
children in the court process.20
Although Illinois was the first state to enact a juvenile court, it was
by no means the last.21 Within twenty-five years, every state besides
Maine and Wyoming had created juvenile court systems comparable to
the one in Illinois.22 Such widespread acceptance of juvenile court reform can be attributed to several factors, such as the expansion of social
work, an emergence of child psychology, and the child welfare movement, which included child labor laws and mandatory school provisions.23 In combination, the influential factors resulted in the acceptance of the juvenile court in an overwhelming number of states by
1925.24
B. Evolution of Juvenile Courts
Throughout the inception of the juvenile court system, legislatures
have retained the presumption that children are inherently good and
thus separate from the rules of criminal procedure.25 This presumption
finds its general roots in the philosophy of parens patriae, which proclaims “the child who has begun to go wrong . . . is to be taken in hand
by the state . . . as the ultimate guardian, because either the unwillingness or inability of the natural parents to guide it toward good citizenship has compelled the intervention.”26 More specifically, however, the
supposition of goodness and morality pervades the doctrine of rehabilitation. Broadly speaking, to rehabilitate is to treat a disease, requiring
an individual diagnosis with the intent to return back to health.27
Therefore, a child cannot be considered inherently evil in order for this
rehabilitative juvenile court system to thrive. Simply put, “the rehabilitative purposes of the juvenile court system can be fulfilled only if the
scope of the regime is limited to those offenders who are capable of re-

18. Michele Benedetto Neitz, A Unique Bench, A Common Code: Evaluating Judicial Ethics in Juvenile Court, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 97, 101 (2011).
19. See Simonsen, supra note 5, at 228.
20. See Fox, supra note 1, at 1193.
21. See generally, Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75
MINN. L. REV. 691 (1991).
22. See Paul W. Tappan, Juvenile Delinquency 172 (1949).
23. See Merril Sobie, Pity the Child: The Age of Delinquency in New York, 30 PACE
L. REV. 1061, 1064 (2010); Fox, supra note 1, at 1230.
24. Tappan, supra note 22, at 172.
25. Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 120 (1909).
26. Id. at 107.
27. See Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 471, 475 (1987).
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habilitation.”28 As a result, the idea of crime and punishment for juveniles remained outside the early twentieth century discourse, which instead focused primarily on treatment and rehabilitation.29 The goal of
rehabilitation therefore controlled the entire juvenile process by the
time this new court system had spread throughout the country.30
Since the goals of the juvenile system focused so significantly on
the treatment of the youth, reformers and critics constantly analyzed
the effects of the courts.31 Similar to the reform movement prior to juvenile courts, changing circumstances and undesirable realities encouraged a further evolution in the juvenile system through the middle of
the twentieth century. One influential factor was state governments and
their increasing control over organizations.32 After earlier failures of the
eighteenth century rehabilitation institutions, states became more involved in moving criminal children into private schools and organizations.33 This transition rendered aspects of the juvenile court system
irrelevant, insofar as the state was able to directly provide rehabilitation services.34 Additionally, industrialization and urbanization limited
the role of the juvenile court to place delinquent children in family or
foster homes.35 Even more, the negative realities of some juvenile housing complexes again encouraged a change in the court system. Critics
discovered that some housing facilities had become less of a home for
juveniles and more of a cellblock, with guards and isolation rooms.36
From all these factors, criticism mounted against the initial juvenile
justice system, which had often limited constitutional rights in favor of a
state-controlled rehabilitation.37
In addition to the circumstantial and sociological changes that produced criticism of the juvenile court system, many critics also struck at
the heart of the system – the rehabilitation doctrine. One emerging
school of thought challenged the perception that children were inherently good.38 Similarly, the idea that someone could eliminate or cure youth
28. Directors of The Columbia Law Review Association, Inc., Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 281, 283 (1967) [hereinafter Rights and Rehabilitation].
29. See Mack, supra note 25, at 107; Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1967).
30. Rights and Rehabilitation, supra note 28, at 282.
31. See generally Helen Leland Witmer & Edith Tufts, The Effectiveness of Delinquency Prevention Programs (1954).
32. Id. at 34–36.
33. Id. at 35–36.
34. Id. at 36.
35. Fox, supra note 1, at 1231.
36. Albert Deutsch, Our Rejected Children 15 (1950).
37. See, e.g., Witmer & Tufts, supra note 31, at 3.
38. Fox, supra note 1, at 1233.
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delinquency was diminishing.39 The population of juveniles was increasing.40 Juvenile crime was reaching an exceptionally high level.41 And
scholarly investigation into the situation revealed that procedural inadequacies perpetuated the problem.42 The practical pressures of the court
system and the statistics to encourage change resulted in another wave
of reconsideration about the juvenile court system.
C. Supreme Court Rulings
As a consequence of the changing mid-twentieth century perceptions, juvenile courts incorporated more formal procedures. Although
many issues existed, the judiciary narrowed its focus to the rights of juveniles and protective judicial procedures. Since parens patriae claimed
to provide such individualized and distinct treatment for the youth, it
also consistently deprived the equivalent of due process protections in
the Constitution.43 The underlying rationale for early due process deprivation was that these rights “would only hinder the court in its benevolent relationship to the child and hinder the child in accepting the
treatment to be provided.”44 Procedural safeguards and constitutional
guarantees were therefore considered unnecessary before the judicial
revolution of the mid-twentieth century.45 Afterwards, juveniles received
many Constitutional rights that they previously had not been afforded,
particularly with respect to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
i. The Early Supreme Court Ruling
The first significant Supreme Court case involving a juvenile was
Haley v. Ohio.46 Although this case occurred twenty years before the
influential 1960s, it marked a transition in the way the Supreme Court
addressed the Constitutional rights of a juvenile. In 1948, a 15-year-old
African-American was arrested as a suspect in a convenience store robbery and shooting.47 Although parties generally disagreed about the
facts, undisputed testimony revealed that the juvenile was arrested
around midnight, questioned without counsel for five hours, shown alleged confessions from two other youth, and then coerced into a confes-

39. Fox, supra note 1, at 1233.
40. See Laura B. Shrestha & Elayne J. Heisler, The Changing Demographic Profile
of the United States, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 15 (Mar. 31, 2011),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32701.pdf.
41. Bernard, supra note 10, at 4.
42. Fox, supra note 1, at 1233.
43. Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Waiver of Rights: Legal and Psychological Competence 3 (Bruce Dennis Sales, 1981).
44. Id. at 4.
45. Id.
46. 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
47. Id. at 597.
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sion.48 Once in jail, and after his mother retained a lawyer, the accused
juvenile was still not allowed any visits by counsel, family, or friends
until he was formally charged three days later.49
The Supreme Court ruled that the Due Process Clause barred the
use of a confession taken illegally from the adolescent.50 Specifically, the
Court stated, “Neither man nor child can be allowed to stand condemned
by methods which flout constitutional requirements of due process of
law.”51 This ruling in Haley v. Ohio is significant because it proclaims
the right of all American citizens—youth and adult—to due process and
fairness.52 Significantly, this judicial application to both juvenile and
adult criminals appears to contradict the original purpose of juvenile
rights. Recall, the initial reform movement sought to treat young criminals differently than adults, and consequently, the entire process afforded different rules and results for a young offender.53 Importantly, the
Supreme Court in its 1948 decision recognized that such stubborn insistence on different treatment can actually restrict Constitutional
rights.54 In other words, blindly using a principle that sought to protect
juveniles had resulted in a deprivation that harms these defendants in
Court.
Furthermore, the Court in Haley demonstrated a flexible and beneficial position. On one hand, the Court ruled that “the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits the police from using the private, secret custody
of either man or child as a device for wringing confessions from them.”55
On the other hand, the Court explicitly considered the accused’s age,
experience, and maturity when it analyzed the actions of the police officers.56 Although twenty years before the wave of Supreme Court cases,
the bench offered a glimpse into future juvenile rights and representation.
ii. Mid-Century Landmark Decisions
At the end of the 1960s, the Supreme Court addressed juvenile
rights with several landmark cases. Changing social and political land48. Id. at 597–98.
49. Id. at 598–99.
50. Id. at 599–600.
51. Id. at 601.
52. Haley, 332 U.S. at 596; See also Sally T. Green, Prosecutorial Waiver into Adult
Criminal Court: A Conflict of Interests Violation Amounting to the States’ Legislative Abrogation of Juveniles’ Due Process Rights, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 233, 263–64 (2005).
53. See supra Part II.B.
54. Haley, 332 U.S. at 596.
55. Id. at 601.
56. Id. at 599–601.
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scapes, as well as the aforementioned inadequacies and faults in the
current juvenile system, resulted in a group of Supreme Court cases
that incorporated a new interpretation and philosophy regarding children in court. The consequence was a fundamental change in how the
judicial system treats juveniles accused of a crime.57
In many ways, this striking change reflected the Supreme Court
decision in Haley v. Ohio, therein providing the same Constitutional
rights to juveniles as the Court has afforded adults. However, equal
treatment supplies not only equal Constitutional rights, but also equal
judicial process and punishment. Thus, while juveniles gained Constitutional protections, they also became subject to the punitive sentencing
that original juvenile reform sought to avoid.
The year 1966 marked the first time the United States Supreme
Court specifically reviewed a state’s statutory juvenile transfer laws.58
In the case of Kent v. United States, a 14-year-old boy named Morris
Kent was arrested for his involvement in several crimes, including
breaking into homes and attempted theft. Two years later, an intruder
entered a woman’s apartment and proceeded to rape her and steal her
wallet.59 The fingerprints at the scene matched up with Kent, who was
on probation at the time.60 Police arrested Kent and brought him to the
station for seven hours of interrogation, at which point he confessed to
the crimes.61 Without arraignment or other probable cause, the police
held Kent in custody for a week and subjected him to juvenile court jurisdiction, according to the District of Columbia Juvenile Code Act.62
Under this code, the juvenile court judge has the authority to waive jurisdiction of a youth if he is 16 years or older and is charged with a felony.63 Despite the mandate to investigate and hold a hearing, the juvenile
court judge ignored Kent’s motion for a hearing and transferred him
into adult criminal court.64
The Supreme Court considered the process of this D.C. juvenile
court and its implications on the accused’s Constitutional rights.65 The
Court held that the D.C. Juvenile Code Act required a full investigation
before a waiver, and thus the juvenile court must conduct a hearing.66
At this hearing, the accused must be given counsel, who has access to all
applicable reports and records.67 In its analysis, the Supreme Court focused on the Constitutional due process rights of the parties in juvenile
57. See Robert C. Trojanowicz & Merry Morash, Juvenile Delinquency: Concepts
and Control 140 (3d ed. 1983).
58. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
59. Id. at 543.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 544.
62. Id. at 544–45.
63. Id. at 547–48.
64. Kent, 383 U.S. at 548.
65. Id. at 551–64.
66. Id. at 561.
67. Id. at 561–62.
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court. Any state’s juvenile legislation, particularly with regards to the
judge’s discretion to waive hearings, must “satisfy the basic requirements of due process and fairness.”68 The Court emphasized the following in its holding:
[T]here is no place in our system of law for reaching such tremendous consequences without ceremony–without hearing,
without effective assistance of counsel, without a statement of
reasons. It is inconceivable that a court of justice dealing with
adults . . . would proceed in this manner. It would be extraordinary if society's special concern over children, as reflected in the
District of Columbia's Juvenile Court Act, permitted this procedure. We hold that it does not.69
In my opinion, the Court's poignant language supports extending
the same due process protections that are enjoyed by adults to juveniles.
Therefore, any state laws that allow transfer of juveniles to criminal
court must satisfy fairness and the Constitutional rights afforded to all
citizens. One particular method to satisfy this fairness and process is to
consider the minor offender through eight particular factors.70 The factors in Kent directed the analysis of the juvenile and imposed a framework through which the transfer procedure must pass.71 The Court still
explicitly gave deference and discretion to the juvenile courts, but did
not authorize complete control, especially of the juvenile’s Constitutional rights.72
In 1967, the Supreme Court addressed the Constitutional rights afforded to juveniles in the case In re Gault.73 There, the Supreme Court
ruled on the rights of a fifteen-year-old boy who was arrested for making
lewd remarks to a neighbor.74 At the time of arrest, Gerald Gault was

68. Id. at 553.
69. Id. at 554.
70. The determinative factors are: (1) the seriousness of the offense to the community and whether protection of the community requires waiver; (2) whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner; (3) whether
the alleged offense was against persons or property; (4) the prosecutive merit of the complaint; (5) the desirability of the trial and dispositions of the entire offense in one court when
the juveniles associates in the alleged offense are adults; (6) the sophistication and maturity
of the juvenile as determined by consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and pattern of living; (7) the record and previous contacts of the juvenile with
the court; (8) the prospects of adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of rehabilitation of the juvenile. Kent, 383 U.S. at 566–67.
71. Id. at 566–568.
72. Id. at 557.
73. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
74. Id. at 4.
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still subject to six months’ probation.75 Police never informed his parents of the arrest and did not properly serve a petition.76 The first hearing had no transcript or complaint presented, and at the second hearing,
Gault was sentenced to the State Industrial School.77 To make matters
worse, under the Arizona juvenile system, this convicted minor was not
entitled to an appeal.78
At the Supreme Court, the issue was whether Gault received sufficient due process when he was adjudicated as a delinquent and sentenced to a state institution.79 On this point, the Court noted the goal of
the juvenile system is to protect the children.80 But in this instance, the
juvenile system had in effect restrained the juvenile’s liberty by placing
him in an industrial school. Because of this, “it would be extraordinary
if our Constitution did not require the procedural regularity and the exercise of care implied in the phrase ‘due process.’”81 The Supreme Court,
therefore, held that notice of the charge must be given to the child’s parents before the hearing and within sufficient time.82
Three years after its ruling in Gault, the Supreme Court instilled
an even higher burden of proof in juvenile cases. In re Winship involved
a twelve-year-old boy who stole $112 from a woman’s purse.83 The original adjudication occurred in the New York Family Court, where a judge
relied on New York processes instead of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution.84 Accordingly, the hearing judge utilized the
“preponderance of the evidence” standard and ordered the child to
eighteen months in a training school, subject to extensions until he
turned eighteen years old.85
Upon review, the Supreme Court took issue with this distinct evidentiary standard, stating, “The same considerations that demand extreme caution in factfinding to protect the innocent adult apply as wel to
the innocent child.”86 According to the Court, individuals of all ages deserve the same Constitutional protections against accusations.87 Since
the Due Process Clause of the Constitution protects the accused to proof
beyond a reasonable doubt when they are charged with violation of a
criminal law, this standard applies to juveniles.88 Thus, the Court ex75. Id.
76. Id. at 5.
77. Id. at 7.
78. Id. at 8.
79. Gault, 387 U.S. at 13.
80. See id. at 14–16; see generally Stephen A. Newman, Forward: The Past, Present, and Future of Juvenile Justice Reform in New York State, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1263
(2011).
81. Gault, 387 U.S. at 27–28.
82. Id. at 31–34.
83. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 360 (1970).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 365.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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panded upon the ruling in Gault and held that “the constitutional safeguard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is as much required during the
adjudicatory stage of a delinquency proceeding as are . . . notice of
charges, right to counsel, the rights of confrontation and examination,
and the privilege against self-incrimination.”89
In accounting for the insufficiencies of juvenile court standards, the
Supreme Court, in the middle of the twentieth century, granted Constitutional due process procedures for all accused members of society.
Again, this apparent triumph in rights and process also embodied a new
perspective regarding adolescent criminals. These Constitutional protections afforded juveniles with rights and responsibilities. As a result, the
trend following Winship involved transferring juveniles to criminal
court.
iii. Social Aftermath
At the very least, Supreme Court decisions expanded the criticism
of juvenile courts in the 1970s. In fact, many commentators interpreted
the rulings as invalidating juvenile courts and their treatment of children.90 Socially, the population of teenagers in America increased even
more, and the crime rates spiked as well.91 Thus, the situation encouraged and simultaneously justified the practice of transferring juvenile
offenders into criminal court. Criminal courts seemed to represent a solution to apparent judicial abuses from juvenile court judges.
Over time, the rhetoric also focused on the superior justiciability of
criminal courts and the necessary punishment for heinous crimes. Coinciding with Supreme Court cases, the United States Federal Government committed resources to studying and understanding crime in the
country. In particular, President Johnson created the Commission on
Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice in 1965.92 The goal
of the Commission was to analyze crime in America, determine a cause
for rising rates, and outline a set of solutions for the issue.93 Published
89. Winship, 397 U.S. at 368.
90. See, e.g., Jennifer Park, Balancing Rehabilitation and Punishment: A Legislative Solution for Unconstitutional Juvenile Waiver Policies, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV.786, 796–
97 (2008); Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice
Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 1071 (1995); Barbara Margaret Farrell, Pennsylvania’s
Treatment of Children Who Commit Murder: Criminal Punishment Has Not Replaced
Parens Patriae, 98 DICK. L. REV. 739, 751 (1994).
91. PRESTON ELROD & R. SCOTT RYDER: JUVENILE JUSTICE: A SOCIAL, HISTORICAL,
AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 25 (2011); see also Shrestha & Heisler, supra note 40, at 15.
92. See President’s Comm’n on Law Enforcement and the Admin. Of Justice, Task
Force Report, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 55–79 (1967).
93. Id.
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in 1967, the Report concluded juvenile courts throughout the country
did not satisfy the system’s initial goals and aspirations.94 In short, it
stated the juvenile court system “has not succeeded significantly in rehabilitating delinquent youth . . . or in bringing justice and compassion
to the child offender.”95 Again, the coinciding suggestion was a different
approach to the youth. The Report determined that delinquent behavior
was prevalent and widespread, especially among the juveniles of the
country and their involvement in less serious offenses.96
In addition to the Report commissioned by the President, other politicians and researchers were simultaneously rejecting the rehabilitation model that laid the foundation to the juvenile court system. The
Quakers, who were instrumental in the early rehabilitative programs,
explained that “after more than a century of persistent failure, this reformist prescription is bankrupt.”97 In 1978, Senator Kennedy wrote,
“[S]entencing in America today under a scheme dominated by a rehabilitative philosophy is a national scandal.”98 Even more, a famous criminal
law report called for a total restructuring of the philosophical foundations of criminal punishments and procedures.99 The critique of rehabilitation focused on the inadequacy of sentencing discretion, the function
of parole, and the uses of probation, among other items.100
Overall, the academic and political sentiment moved away from rehabilitation and towards retribution. By the end of the 1970s, a generally pessimistic sentiment existed in the area of research and rehabilitation of juveniles. Some researchers even called it the “Nothing Works”
Doctrine.101 Between the 1970s and 1980s, states shifted their focus in
juvenile law to punishment and deterrence.102 The shift coincided with
several political taskforce publications, particularly in the form of Justice Reports.103 These taskforce reports generally concluded that the rehabilitative model should be abandoned, given its inconsistencies, unex-

94. Id.
95. Id. at 80.
96. Id. at 55.
97. Working Party of the American Friends Service Committee, Struggle for Justice: A report on Crime and Punishment in America 8 (1971).
98. Edward M. Kennedy, Symposium on Sentencing Part I, Introduction, 7
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 1 (1978).
99. Wayne Lafave & Austin W. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law 23 (Jesse H.
Chopper et al. eds., 1972).
100. See generally Francis Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal: Penal Policy and Social Purpose (1981).
101. See, e.g., Francis T. Cullen, Rehabilitation: Beyond Nothing Works, 42 CRIME &
JUST. 299 (2013).
102. Barry Krisberg & James F. Austin, Reinventing Juvenile Justice, 23
CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGY 710, 710–11 (Sept. 1994).
103. See generally J. Feinberg, Doing And Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility (1970); R. Singer, Just Deserts: Sentencing Based On Equality And Desert
(1979); Alan M. Dershowitz, Fair And Certain Punishment: Report of the Twentieth Century
Fund Task Force on Criminal Sentencing (1976).
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pected and inhumane consequences, and exploitation.104 Additionally,
the end of the 1970s saw reformation in criminal sentencing. After initial unsuccessful attempts to pass legislation, Congress succeeded in
enacting the Sentencing Reform Act in 1984.105 Among other things, the
Act combined the political rejection of the rehabilitative structure into
general sentencing guidelines that judges and other judicial officials
could utilize.106 Symbolically, it was this Act that signaled the removal
of individualized sentencing and hopes for rehabilitation.
D. National Juvenile Transfer Laws
The transition away from a theory and practice of rehabilitation affected the juvenile population and its position in the American court
system. Due to the academic research, political discourse, new legislation, and statistical evidence, juveniles began to receive punishment for
the sake of vengeance.107 At the time, most state juvenile court legislation had mechanisms through which serious juvenile offenders could be
transferred into criminal court and treated as an adult.108 In many cases, these transfer laws had originated with the inception of the juvenile
courts.109 For instance, according to the Pennsylvania Juvenile Act that
passed in 1933, an offender could be transferred into criminal court if he
or she was “above the age of fourteen years” and charged with an offense
that is “punishable by imprisonment in a State penitentiary.”110 In
states where transfer was allowed, it often occurred without procedural
formalities. However, it was precisely this issue that the Supreme Court
addressed in Kent v. United States.111 The 1966 ruling made clear that
decisions which impair a juvenile’s right to be heard in juvenile court
could not occur “without ceremony.”112 Then, because of the increasing
social and political pressure, more than half of the United States made

104. See generally J. Feinberg, Doing And Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility (1970); R. Singer, Just Deserts: Sentencing Based On Equality And Desert
(1979); Alan M. Dershowitz, Fair And Certain Punishment: Report of the Twentieth Century
Fund Task Force on Criminal Sentencing (1976).
105. Chapter II of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473,
98 Stat. 1988 (1984).
106. See generally id.
107. See Krisberg & Austin, supra note 102, at 710–11.
108. Feld, supra note 27, at 478.
109. Id.
110. Act of June 2, 1933, No. 311, § 18, 1933 Pa. Laws 1441; see also Com. ex. rel.
Freeman v. Superintendent of State Corr. Inst. at Camp Hill, 242 A.2d 903, 905 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1968).
111. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966).
112. Id.
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it easier to transfer juveniles to criminal court by 1976.113 These states
struck a balance between constitutionality and transfer laws.114 First
and foremost, the transfer laws needed to be constitutional following the
United States Supreme Court decision in Kent, and as a result, states
decided to utilize the criteria set forth in Kent as their new transfer provisions.115
One way states have transferred a juvenile into criminal court is
through statutory exclusion. With statutory exclusion—also referred to
as “statutory waiver,” “legislative exclusion,” and “mandatory waiver”—
a state statute is able to exclude particular offenses from the juvenile
court’s authority altogether.116 Similar to the transfer laws, some of
these statutory exclusions were in place at the inception of the juvenile
court system, and thus pre-dated the Kent and Gault rulings. The
aforementioned Pennsylvania Juvenile Act, for instance, contained statutory language that excluded an individual from juvenile court if he or
she was charged with murder.117 A statutory exclusion of this sort allowed juveniles to be tried in criminal court without the heightened constitutional scrutiny required by the Supreme Court. The most common
method is designating the specific offenses in legislation that will exclude a juvenile from juvenile court.118 Many states have utilized this
legislative waiver, both before the 1960s Supreme Court cases and after.119 In 1987, Professor Feld effectively described the use of these statutes in different states:
The dates when these offense exclusions statutes were adopted
are especially significant. Although the capital/life sentence exclusions have been in the statutes for more than forty years in
states such as Colorado, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, and Vermont, thirteen of the present offense exclusion
states have adopted or have expanded this strategy within the
past fifteen years. Beginning in 1970, and in direct response to
the Supreme Court's Kent decision, Congress excluded a catalogue of offenses from the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts of
the District of Columbia. By 1975, four other states followed
suit, and, by 1980, nine states excluded serious present offenses

113. See Krisberg & Austin, supra note 102, at 710–11.
114. See Feld, supra note 27, at 489–490.
115. See, e.g., Feld, supra note 27, at 490.
116. See Rachel Jacobs, Waving Goodbye to Due Process: The Juvenile Waiver System, 19 CARDOZO J. L. & GENDER 989, 1000–01 (2013).
117. Act of June 2, 1933, supra note 110.
118. See, e.g., Feld, supra note 27, at 508–10 (providing the examples of California,
Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, New Mexico, Virginia, and Washington as states with specific present offense waiver statutes. These states are in addition to
the nearly 20 states that list present offenses or prior records to be considered for waiver.).
119. Id. at 505–07 (Table listing the year each waiver statute was added to state legislation).
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from juvenile court jurisdiction. The remaining states have acted
similarly since 1980.120
As expected, even more changes have occurred since the publication of
Professor Feld’s report. In many cases, states have added additional categories to their legislative waiver statutes.121 The trend, then, is to designate certain serious offenses in the state statute in order to try juveniles in criminal court.
Not every juvenile transfer into criminal court is the result of legislative waiver statutes. A waiver can also occur through the prosecutor’s
discretion, in what is called “prosecutorial waiver,” “concurrent jurisdiction,” or “direct file.”122 In such a case, prosecutors decide whether a
case is filed in juvenile court or adult criminal court.123 This prosecutorial transfer method arose most commonly after the Supreme Court cases of the 1960s and 1970s, and employed the notion that concurrent jurisdiction was available to the juvenile and criminal courts.124 In this
way, it is the prosecutor’s decision to determine the forum, and this
choice cannot be appealed.125 Although it does not compel the transfer
of the juvenile like the legislative waiver, the prosecutorial transfer
method has received significant criticism due to the ease of transfer, the
dependence upon the prosecutor, and the potential for abuse.126 In other
words, prosecutorial waiver “raises concerns of arbitrariness, since it is
not always subject to judicial review . . . [and] the decision frequently
depends on the philosophy of the prosecutor and judge, the political climate, the publicity surrounding the offenses, and the make-up of the

120. Feld, supra note 27, at 517.
121. See, e.g., Francis Barry McCarthy, The Serious Offender and Juvenile Court Reform: The Case for Prosecutorial Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
629, 655 n.134 (1994) (noting examples of expansion in the use of legislative waiver in Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Hawaii, Montana, and New Jersey in the years between 1987 and
1994).
122. See generally Lisa A. Cintron, Rehabilitating the Juvenile Court System: Limiting Juvenile Transfers to Adult Criminal Court, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1254 (1996).
123. See Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal
Court: A Case Study and Analysis of Prosecutorial Waiver, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL’Y 281, 284–85 (1991).
124. Id. at 285.
125. Dean J. Champion & G. Larry Mays, Transferring Juveniles to Criminal
Courts: Trends and Implications for Criminal Justice 72 (1991).
126. See, e.g., Julie B. Falis, Statutory Exclusion—When the Prosecutor Becomes the
Abuser, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 81, 94 (1998); Robert O. Dawson, An Empirical Study of Kent
Style Juvenile Transfers to Criminal Court, 23 ST. MARY’S L.J. 975, 1001 (1992); Deborah L.
Johnson, Debra E. Banister, & Michelle L. Alm, The Violent Youth Offender and Juvenile
Transfer to the Adult Criminal Court, 2004 J. INST. JUST. INT’L. STUD. 84, 89 (2004).
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community.”127 Despite its drawbacks, prosecutorial waiver usage has
increased more than four times since the 1970s.128
A third method to transfer an individual out of juvenile court and
into criminal court is through judicial waiver. As the centerpiece of the
decision in Kent, judicial waiver is the original transfer methodology in
which a judge determines whether a juvenile ought to be transferred
and tried in criminal court.129 Although judges often exercise their discretion according to the applicable state statute and the elements from
Kent,130 the final decision is theirs alone to make. On one hand, this
process allows for an individualized determination based on a variety of
factors.131 However, on the other hand, the judge often incorporates the
prosecutor’s suggestions to simplify the procedure, is frequently influenced by the juvenile’s race, and typically makes inconsistent rulings.132
Nevertheless, all but five states utilize judicial waiver in some form.133
E. Idaho Juvenile Transfer Laws
Originally enacted in 1977, Idaho’s judicial waiver statute originated as part of the state’s Youth Rehabilitation Act and allows for the
transfer of juveniles into adult criminal court.134 The original statute
permitted a waiver of the juvenile jurisdiction and the transfer to adult
proceedings as long as the child was at least fourteen years of age and
was “alleged to have committed an act . . . [which would be a crime if
committed by an adult].”135 Similar to other states at the time, the legislation lists many of the factors from the Kent Supreme Court case136
as a way to identify the issues when determining whether to waive the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction.137 Then, in 1981, Idaho added a legislative
127. Chelsea Dunn, Condemning Our Youth to Lives as Criminals: Incarcerating
Children as Adults, 11 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 30, 37–38 (2008).
128. Donna M. Bishop, Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal Justice System, 27
CRIME & JUST. 81, 108 (2000).
129. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966); Dunn, supra note 127, at
36–37; see generally Dawson, supra note 126.
130. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 566–67; see supra note 70 (listing the 8 determinative factors).
131. Daniel M. Vannella, Let the Jury do the Waive: How Apprendi v. New Jersey
Applies to Juvenile Transfer Proceedings, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 740 (2006).
132. Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691,
704–05 (1991).
133. The five states that do not have statutes allowing judicial waiver are Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Nebraska, New York, New Mexico. See Vannella, supra note 131, at 739.
134. See IDAHO CODE § 16-1806 (2016) (amended and redesignated in 1995 as IDAHO
CODE § 20-508 (2016)) in the section titled ‘Waiver of Jurisdiction and Transfer to Other
Courts.
135. IDAHO CODE § 16-1806(1)(a) (2016) (amended and resdesignated in 1995 as
IDAHO CODE § 20-508(1)(a) (2016)).
136. See supra note 70 (listing the 8 determinative factors from Kent).
137. “In considering whether or not to waive juvenile court jurisdiction over the
child, the juvenile court shall consider the following factors: (a) The seriousness of the offense
and whether the protection of the community requires isolation of the child beyond that afforded by juvenile facilities; (b) Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive,
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waiver section (§ 16-1806A) to its Code to provide the definitions of violent offenses and to outline the proper proceedings against the offenders.138 This 1981 addition conformed with the national trend to delineate the offenses that result in mandatory transfer to criminal court. The
1981 addition mandated automatic transfer of a juvenile to the adult
criminal court system if he or she was charged with any one of the following five violent crimes: murder of any degree or attempted murder;
robbery; rape (excluding statutory rape); mayhem; and assault or battery with the intent to commit any of the aforementioned crimes.139
In 1984, the Idaho legislature amended the list of violent offenses,
adding “forcible sexual penetration by the use of a foreign object” and
“infamous crimes against nature, committed by force or violence.”140
Also, the scope widened even further, so that all other crimes (felonies
or misdemeanors) charged in the complaint will proceed as an adult in
every respect.141 The expansion continued in 1990, when the section
added a controlled substance violation to the crimes delineated for mandatory transfer.142 In this way, a juvenile caught with a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of any school, as well as any structure used for
a school activity, would be transferred as a matter of law to adult criminal court.143

violent, premeditated, or willful manner; (c) Whether the alleged offense was against persons
or property, greater weight being given to offenses against persons; (d) The maturity of the
child as determined by considerations of his home, environment, emotional attitude, and
pattern of living; (e) The juvenile's record and previous history of contacts with the juvenile
corrections system; (f) The likelihood that the juvenile will develop competency and life skills
to become a contributing member of the community by use of facilities and resources available to the court; (g) The amount of weight to be given to each of the factors listed in subsection (8) of this section is discretionary with the court, and a determination that the minor is
not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court law may be based on
any one (1) or a combination of the factors set forth within this section, which shall be recited
in the order of waiver.” IDAHO CODE § 16-1806(8) (2016) (amended and resdesignated in
1995 as IDAHO CODE § 20-508(8) (2016)).
138. IDAHO CODE § 16-1806A (2016) (amended and resdesignated in 1995 as IDAHO
CODE § 20-509 (2016)).
139. IDAHO CODE § 16-1806A(1)(a-g) (2016) (amended and resdesignated in 1995 as
IDAHO CODE § 20-509(a–j) (2016)).
140. IDAHO CODE § 16-1806A (2016) (amended and resdesignated in 1995 as IDAHO
CODE § 20-509 (2016)).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. “A violation of the provisions of section 37-2732(a)(1)(A)(B) or (C), Idaho Code,
when the violation occurred on or within one thousand (1,000) feet of the property of any
public or private primary or secondary school, or in those portions of any building, park,
stadium or other structure or grounds which were, at the time of the violation, being used for
an activity sponsored by or through such a school.” IDAHO CODE § 16-1806A(1)(h) (2016)
(amended and resdesignated in 1995 as IDAHO CODE § 20-509(1)(i) (2016)).
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Consequently, Idaho legislation provides a variety of methods in
which a young offender can be transferred out of juvenile court. If a
specified crime has allegedly been committed, a fourteen-year-old will
automatically waive his or her right to participate in juvenile court due
to Idaho’s statute.144 Even more, after any criminal act by a minor of any
age, a judge or prosecutor can make a motion to transfer the juvenile
into criminal court system.145 The number and scope of offenses in the
mandatory waiver statute, as well as the addition of a judicial waiver
option that applies to any crime, makes Idaho’s juvenile transfer laws
some of the most extensive in the United States. Although the average
national transfer age is at least sixteen years old, Idaho uses one of the
youngest mandatory ages in the country, and allows for even younger
upon hearing.146 Even the original list of violent offenses, in 1981, contained more offenses than the majority of other states.147 Idaho may not
have the absolute youngest age for automatic waiver or the longest list
of statutory offenses, but the combination of quantity and character of
the transfer statutes allows for an atmosphere in Idaho that frequently
tries juveniles as adults in the state’s criminal courts.
Idaho’s automatic transfer rule violates the specific Due Process
requirements set forth in Kent. The Supreme Court in Kent clearly expressed that a court must take care to consider unique factors when it
determines jurisdiction for the case and issues a sentence to a juvenile
offender.148 The Kent decision famously indicated the eight particular
factors a court must weigh in this determination.149 Following the judicial ruling, Idaho incorporated all these factors into its legislation in
some degree, as a protective measure and to ensure the constitutionality
of its statute.150 To that extent, the Idaho legislation had successfully
implemented the Supreme Court holding into its state law. However, an
amendment in 1981—to automatically mandate transfer for certain violent crimes—changed Idaho’s position in the matter.151
Since the introduction of ID Code § 16-1806A—now § 20-509—the
state has abandoned the Supreme Court precedent in Kent and the requirement of individual consideration. The legislation allowed for exceptions to the eight specific factors and failed to mandate them in every
juvenile case. Instead of a procedural requirement, the consideration of
such factors now only applies to specific crimes and specific hearings.152
However, if the prosecution alleges murder, robbery, rape, mayhem, as144. See IDAHO CODE § 20-509 (2016).
145. Id.
146. Feld, supra note 27, at 512–13.
147. Id.
148. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 543 (1966).
149. See Feld, supra note 132, at 704–05.
150. IDAHO CODE § 16-1806(8) (2016) (amended and redesignated in 1995 as IDAHO
CODE §20-509 (2016)).
151. See supra note 143.
152. IDAHO CODE § 20-509 (2016).
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sault, forcible sexual penetration, or a controlled substance violation
near a school, then the juvenile court automatically waives its jurisdiction without utilizing the precise factors from Kent.153 Thus, by automatically transferring a juvenile into criminal court and trying him or
her as an adult, Idaho courts fail to consider the age, maturity, level of
culpability, and potential for rehabilitation.
Kent held that a proceeding must provide a hearing, effective counsel, and legitimate reasons before waiving the juvenile court jurisdiction
and trying a youth in an adult criminal court.154 The Court sought to
protect juveniles from thoughtless mandates and automation, and thus
prioritized the hearings in which juvenile offenders receive individual
consideration.155 The holding required that a full investigation and
hearing occur before the transfer, since the move into adult criminal
court is of consequence in itself.
Idaho’s mandatory transfer statute is contradictory to the holding
and reasoning in Kent. Although the Kent factors apply in some instances in Idaho, they are ignored for many circumstances, solely due to the
crime committed.156 As a consequence of specific enumerated crimes,
Idaho’s youths are automatically and irreversibly move into criminal
court for adult criminal sentencing, without the required hearing that
considers culpability and amenability to rehabilitation.157 Idaho juvenile courts release their jurisdiction according to the charged offenses
and without a hearing. Since Kent found a violation of due process when
the D.C. juvenile court failed to hold a hearing or investigate allegations
for a fourteen-year-old, Idaho’s statute is a Constitutional violation because it allows for automatic transfers based only on the alleged offense.158 In the event that the alleged crime is one enumerated in ID
Code § 20-509, the juvenile’s fate is determined.159 Thus, insofar as Kent
requires a hearing, counsel, and legitimate due process, the Idaho transfer rules violate the Supreme Court precedent.160
F. Recent Supreme Court Rulings on Juveniles in Criminal Courts
While state legislatures passed laws concerning juvenile rights and
their position in the court system, the United States Supreme Court also
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at § 20-509(1).
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966).
Id. at 553.
IDAHO CODE § 20-509(1) (2016).
See Kent, 383 U.S. at 567.
See id.
IDAHO CODE § 20-509(1) (2016).
See Kent, 383 U.S. at 567.
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addressed the issue.161 As a result of state legislation and juvenile transfer laws, more severe sentences were imposed upon youth who were
tried as adults, without the sentencing limits or protections that often
exist in juvenile court.162 State courts penalized violent offenders as
though they were competent adults, and issued sentences accordingly.163
Within the last ten years, the Supreme Court decided three cases concerning juveniles and their position within the criminal court system.164
The rulings have resounding national consequences with regard to juveniles, as well as psychological, social, and scientific conclusions about
mental and physical capacity.
i. New Rulings Uphold Juvenile Rights and Issue Protections for Minors
As more juveniles were more frequently tried in the adult criminal
court system, the Supreme Court initially had a difficult time deciding
the constitutionality of extended sentences. One major ruling came in
1988, when the Court prohibited the execution of any criminals under
sixteen years of age, even if they committed violent crimes.165 In its ruling, the Court reasoned that “the potential deterrent value of the death
sentence is insignificant . . . .”166 However, it took only one year for the
discourse surrounding capital punishment and its effectiveness to reverse course. In Stanford v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court found that an
individual who murders at the age of sixteen can be punished by death,
and such a punishment “does not offend the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.”167 The Court found evidence for its opinion in historical and societal consensus.168
Like a pendulum, this attitude and social acceptance used in Stanford inverted by 2005, when the Supreme Court overruled itself once
again. That year, in Roper v. Simmons, the Court distinctly abrogated
the ruling in Stanford and held that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibit the execution of all individuals who committed
crimes before they turned eighteen.169 In Roper, the seventeen-year-old
defendant and his two friends planned and executed the murder of a
woman.170 After breaking and entering her home, the defendant tied up
the victim and threw her off a bridge, where she drowned in the water
below.171 At trial in Missouri, the defendant was convicted of first-

165. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837–38 (1988).
166. Id. at 837.
167. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
168. Id.
169. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555 (2005).
170. Id. at 556.
171. Id. at 557.
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degree murder and sentenced to death.172 However, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision, citing the Eighth
Amendment.173 In its appellate review, the United States Supreme
Court again looked to social opinion and evolving standards,174 but this
time noted how the majority of states were trending away from the
death penalty for juveniles.175 The Court took particular care to dissect
the Eighth Amendment and whether a penalty of death is unconstitutional for a juvenile.176 After some analysis, the Court concluded that a
juvenile should not be subject to “the most severe punishment” because
juveniles are different from adults in their sense of responsibility, their
vulnerability to negative influences and outside pressure, and their formation of character.177 Furthermore, the death penalty fails to satisfy
the goals of retribution or deterrence in a juvenile.178 Consequently, the
Supreme Court overruled Stanford v. Kentucky and held that the
“Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death
penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes
were committed.”179
The Supreme Court considered extended juvenile sentencing five
years later, when it heard the case Graham v. Florida.180 When the defendant was sixteen years old, he attempted to rob a barbeque restaurant with three other young men.181 During the robbery attempt, the
defendant’s accomplice used a metal bar to strike a worker in the
head.182 Charged for armed robbery, the defendant was tried as an
172. Id. at 558.
173. Id. at 559–60.
174. The idea of evolving standards comes from an early Supreme Court case, calling
for the Court to look beyond simple history when determining what is cruel and unusual
punishment, and instead look to “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). The Court justifies this approach by looking to relativity, and the ethical nature of the question of ‘what is cruel?’ To
this, the Court often quotes the dissenting opinion of a 1972 case: “A punishment is inordinately cruel, in the sense we must deal with it in these cases, chiefly as perceived by the
society so characterizing it. The standard of extreme cruelty is not merely descriptive, but
necessarily embodies a moral judgment. The standard itself remains the same, but its applicability must change as the basic mores of society change.” Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 382 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
175. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564 (noting that 30 states prohibit the death penalty for individuals under 18 years of age); Id. at 575–78 (explaining the national and international
trend towards abolishing the juvenile death penalty).
176. See id.
177. Id. at 568–70.
178. Id. at 571.
179. Id. at 578.
180. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
181. Id. at 53.
182. Id.
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adult under Florida law and received three years of probation under a
plea agreement.183 While on probation, the defendant attempted several
more robberies, one of which ended in a high-speed chase and an arrest.184 The trial court found the defendant guilty of armed burglary
and attempted armed robbery, and sentenced him to the maximum sentences for each crime respectively, which was life imprisonment and fifteen years.185 The Florida Court of Appeals affirmed the sentences, noting the violent nature of the offenses and the culpability of this seventeen-year-old.186
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the majority analyzed the national consensus and the legislation of the states.187 Even though thirtyseven states allowed life sentences without parole, the Court considered
the frequency of these sentences in order to determine the national
trend and sentiment.188 Through this perspective, the Court concluded
that even the states that allowed juvenile life sentences were infrequently utilizing them.189 Combining this trend with some evidence
from Roper, the Supreme Court explained the unfortunate position of
juveniles with respect to punishment and extended prison sentences.
The majority opinion noted the severity of the life sentence without parole, especially for juveniles, who are less deserving of severe punishments, will spend a greater percentage of life in prison, and achieve few
of the intended penological benefits.190 For these reasons, the Court
held, “The Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole
sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.”191
The Supreme Court’s analysis in Graham produced a categorical
rule for juveniles and the sentences they can receive. Although the sentence in question did not involve the death penalty, it was extreme
enough to warrant a complete analysis as to the position of juveniles
and the effectiveness of punishment. As a result, the Court weighed the
constitutionality of the life sentence without the possibility of parole in a
manner that incorporated scientific characteristics and the components
of the Eighth Amendment. The implication of Graham, then, is seen on
the entire practice of sentencing juveniles, and contributes to a universal effect.192 Consequently, the Supreme Court was willing to hear and
rule upon a similar case two years later in Miller v. Alabama.193
183. Id. at 54.
184. Id. at 54–55.
185. Id. at 57.
186. Graham, 560 U.S. at 58.
187. Id. at 62.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See id. at 68–72.
191. Id. at 82.
192. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 61–62. The alternative (and one that is much more
common) is a challenge to the defendant’s own sentence in particular. To this effect, the
Court goes to length to distinguish the defendant’s case from other seemingly similar issues:
“The present case involves an issue the Court has not considered previously: a categorical
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In Miller, the Supreme Court considered two cases that involved
juveniles convicted of murder at the age of fourteen.194 Both young men
were sentenced at the lower courts to life imprisonment without the opportunity of parole.195 One case, Miller v. State, involved a juvenile
named Evan Miller who attacked his mother’s drug dealer with a baseball bat.196 In order to hide evidence of the crime, Miller and his friend
set fire to the drug dealer’s trailer, resulting in his death.197 The state
charged the juvenile with murder in the course of arson, which holds a
mandatory sentence of life without parole.198 The companion case to
Miller was Jackson v. Norris.199 There, the defendant named Kuntrell
Jackson waited outside while his two friends used a shotgun to rob a
video store.200 When the shop owner refused and threatened to call the
police, one friend shot and killed him.201 Through the Arkansas statute,202 the state prosecuted Jackson as an adult, and charged him with
a capital felony murder and aggravated robbery. Like Miller, Jackson
was sentenced to life in jail without parole, and the United States Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari.203
In the Miller opinion, the Court concluded that the respective
states’ mandatory prison sentences were unconstitutional. In both cases,
the laws “mandated that each juvenile die in prison even if a judge or
jury thought that his youth and its attendant characteristics, along with
nature of his crime” demanded a lesser sentence.204 The Court held that
the sentences of life without the possibility of parole for juveniles were
unconstitutional for two particular reasons. Firstly, the Supreme Court
had previously barred any capital punishment or life without parole
challenge to a term-of-years sentence. The approach in [other] cases ... is suited for considering a gross proportionality challenge to a particular defendant's sentence, but here a sentencing practice itself is in question. This case implicates a particular type of sentence as it applies to an entire class of offenders who have committed a range of crimes. As a result, a
threshold comparison between the severity of the penalty and the gravity of the crime does
not advance the analysis. Here, in addressing the question presented, the appropriate analysis is the one used in cases that involved the categorical approach.”
193. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
194. Id. at 2460.
195. Id.
196. Miller v. State, 63 So. 3d 676 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010), rev'd, 132 S. Ct. 2455
(2012).
197. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460.
198. Id. at 2463; See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-40(a)(9) (2013); ALA. CODE § 13A-6-2(c)
(2013).
199. 378 S.W.3d 103 (Ark. 2011), rev'd, 132 S. Ct. at 2455 (2012).
200. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461.
201. Id.
202. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(c)(2) (2011).
203. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463.
204. Id. at 2460.
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sentences for juveniles who commited non-homicide crimes.205 The
Court intentionally imposed categorical bans on such sentencing practices in Roper and Graham, particularly because the culpability of the
juveniles and the severity of the sentence were so disproportionately
imbalanced.206 Secondly, the Supreme Court had previously ruled that
justices must impose sentences based on the characteristics of the accused and the details of his offense.207 By combining precedent of previous decisions, the Court in Miller held that juveniles are entitled to individualized consideration before receiving a sentence of life without the
possibility of parole.208 Thus, this sentence, as well as any statute mandating such a sentence, would violate the Eighth Amendment.
ii. Objective Criteria and its Role in an Evolving Penalty Standard
Through its ruling in Miller, the Supreme Court endorsed the
trending attitudes of the nation, conforming to what it claimed were
“evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society [standards within society].”209 The Court determined society’s
standards with a consideration of objective factors such as state legislation, as well as justifications for sentencing.210 An analysis of the legislation alone revealed that still twenty-nine states allowed the juvenile
sentencing of life without parole, yet, the majority concluded that no
national consensus was needed in this regard.211
Although the Supreme Court in Miller was not the first to utilize
social standards and objective indicia,212 it used this evidence to reject
the harsh penalties imposed on juveniles. To decide if a punishment is
cruel and unusual, and thus in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the
205. Id. at 2463; see generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Graham v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
206. See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48 (2010).
207. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), where the United States
Supreme Court held that the death sentence imposed by the lower court was unconstitutional insofar as it violated the 8th and 14th Amendments. The Court stated, “While the prevailing practice of individualizing sentencing determinations generally reflects simply enlightened policy rather than a constitutional imperative, we believe that in capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment requires consideration of
the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular
offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of
death.” Id. at 304; see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
208. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
209. Id. at 2463.
210. Id. at 2465–70.
211. Id. at 2471.
212. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 277 (1972) (stating, “we must make
certain that the judicial determination is as objective as possible”); Weems v. United States,
217 U.S. 349, 380 (1910) (arguing that the Court must consider how different jurisdictions
evaluate the mode of punishment); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 462
(1947) (suggesting that the Court ought to use historical and jurisdictional usage in order to
determine acceptability of punishments).
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Supreme Court has also considered objective factors.213 Some of the objective factors arise in the form of statutes that are passed by the elected
officials of society.214 In this regard, the Court presumes statutes written by democratically elected representatives are constitutional.215 The
statutes containing the objective factors reflect the will of the electorate,
which include citizens of the nation. But even more, the Supreme Court
uses the objective factors to determine social acceptance of a punishment.216 Justice Brennan delivered this idea of social acceptance in his
concurring opinion of Furman v. Georgia:
The question under this principle, then, is whether there are objective indicators from which a court can conclude that contemporary society considers a severe punishment unacceptable. Accordingly, the judicial task is to review the history of a challenged punishment and to examine society's present practices
with respect to its use.217
This goal to determine social acceptance through objective means
also incorporates science. In fact, one of the most important objective
factors is research by developmental and neurological scientists that
explores psychological differences between adults and minors. The use
of science emerged in Roper, when the Supreme Court reasoned that
juveniles, by their nature, have a diminished capacity when compared to
adults.218 Thus, according to Roper, the scientific nature of juveniles
indicates that they cannot be part of the class who deserves the death
penalty.219 The Court in Roper explicitly noted the scientific consensus
at the time of its ruling (2005).220 Subsequent cases continue to cite the
Roper science as authoritative and give no reason to reconsider the issues.221 Roper conclusively explains three main differences between
adults and juveniles.222 First, minors possess a “lack of maturity and
underdeveloped sense of responsibility” which often results in “impetu213. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 592 (1977).
214. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987).
215. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976).
216. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 462 (1947) (suggesting that the Court ought to use historical and jurisdictional usage in order to determine
acceptability of punishments).
217. Furman, 408 U.S. at 278–79.
218. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570.
219. Id. at 569–71.
220. Id.
221. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010) (“No recent data provide reason
to reconsider the Court's observations in Roper about the nature of juveniles.”).
222. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70.
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ous and ill-considered actions and decisions.”223 To support this contention, the Court cites data that adolescents disproportionately engage in
reckless behavior in every regard.224 Then, to further the point, the
holding notes how every state recognizes the immaturity and irresponsibility of children by not allowing citizens under the age of eighteen to
vote or serve on juries.225 Second, “juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer
pressure.”226 The Court supports this second factor with evidence that
juveniles have less control than adults over their environment.227 Third,
“the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult.”228
Overall, the holding in Roper integrated the scientific conclusions about
juveniles in order to rule that even if the crime is heinous, a minor is a
different type of offender than an adult. Youth are immature, irrational,
irresponsible, vulnerable, and struggling to find an identity, and their
actions fail to indicate depraved character. Roper then used all of these
findings to support a holding that disallowed the execution of individuals younger than eighteen.229
The Supreme Court continued to address the contrasts between juveniles and adults while maintaining its focus on the differences in scientific discoveries. In Graham, the Court agreed with the scientific findings from Roper in a decision that reached beyond the issue of life sentences for non-homicidal crimes.230 In Graham, the Court imposed its
categorical analysis to non-homicide juvenile offenders, and relied on
developments in neuroscience for support.231 The Court used scientific
studies to explain the fundamental differences between youth and adult
brains, before agreeing with Roper that it is “misguided to equate the
failings of a minor with those of an adult.”232 As evidence, the majority
spoke of the early psychological and sociological theories about juvenile
brain development, and then reinforced these ideas with current trends
and advancements in neurological studies.233 The Court then concluded
that “parts of the brain involved in behavior continue to mature through
late adolescence.”234 Also, juveniles have more of an ability to change in
the future, and therefore their behavior is less of an indication of de223. Id. at 569 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
224. Id. (citing Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental
Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339 (1992)).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. (citing Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of
Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death
Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003)).
228. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570.
229. Id. at 572.
230. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68–69 (2010).
231. Id. at 61–62.
232. Id. at 68; Roper, 543 U.S. at 570.
233. Graham, 560 U.S. at 68.
234. Id. at 68.
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praved character.235 The result is then that psychology and brain science proved—even in 2010 when the opinion released—“fundamental
differences between juvenile and adult minds.”236
Related to the Supreme Court’s rationale, scientific data continues
to support these differences between adults and juveniles. MRI brain
scans show that the frontal lobe is essential for “volition, planning, selection, sequential organization, and self-monitoring of actions.”237 The
frontal cortices are used during high-level reasoning, regulation of emotion, goal planning, comprehension, and impulse control.238 However,
this critically important frontal lobe is not fully developed until adulthood.239 The normal brains of minors are in the process of developing,
which impacts the neurological processes of youth.240 Studies demonstrate the comparative effects of such underdevelopment when the same
task requires adolescents to utilize different brain processes than
adults.241 Thus, with the multitude of functional brain imaging results,
scientists have made the connection between the neurological and the
behavioral. One expert concluded, “[t]o the extent that transformations
occurring in adolescent brains contribute to the characteristic behavioral predispositions of adolescence, adolescent behavior is in part biologically determined.”242
Neurological studies also focus on the link between adolescent behavior and its scientific explanation. For instance, studies note the biological explanation for risk-taking behavior, especially related to the
changing frontal brain regions.243 These risks are often characterized by

235.
236.
237.

Id.
Id.
Celine Chayer & Morris Freedman, Frontal Lobe Functions, 1 CURRENT
NEUROLOGY & NEUROSCIENCE REP. 547, 547 (2001).
238. See Michael S. Gazzaniga et al., Cognitive Neuroscience 75 (2002).
239. See, e.g., Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., In Vivo Evidence for Post-Adolescent Brain
Maturation in Frontal and Striatal Regions, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 859, 860 (10th ed.
1999) (revealing the differences in maturation of brain regions from childhood to young
adulthood, with use of an MRI); Jay N. Giedd et al., Brain Development During Childhood
and Adolescence: A Longitudinal MRI Study, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 861, 861–62 (10th
ed. 1999) (studying matter in frontal lobe with an MRI, and finding a pre-adolescent increase
in cortical gray matter with an increase in white matter during adolescence).
240. See Tomás Paus et al., Structural Maturation of Neural Pathways in Children
and Adolescents: In Vivo Study, 283 SCIENCE 1908, 1908 (1999).
241. See Abigail A. Baird et al., Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging of Facial
Affect Recognition in Children and Adolescents, 38 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT
PSYCHIATRY 195, 198-99 (1999).
242. L.P. Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age-Related Behavioral Manifestations,
24 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVS. 417, 447 (2000).
243. Id. at 421–24; Laurence Steinberg, Risk-Taking in Adolescence: What Changes,
and Why?, 1021 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 51, 57 (2006) (concluding, “[m]y argument is that
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behavior-seeking stimuli that produce sensations, pleasures, and rewards.244 Other studies connect the propensity of alcohol consumption
with the underdeveloped brain.245 Tests also determine that an adolescent brain experiences more pleasure and addictive tendencies from tobacco than an adult brain.246 The substance influences relate to the research on forethought, which concludes that adolescents possess weak
future-orientation, fail to effectively anticipate consequences, and disregard risk.247 The massive amount of neurological and behavioral science
led some researchers and scholars to reconsider free will and culpability
in the criminal law context.248 Even more modest commentators note
the new and necessary role of neuroscience in determining rationality.249
Overall, the Supreme Court decisions in Furman, Roper, Graham,
and then most recently in Miller, reveal several important principles.
First, the Court is looking to objective criteria to determine the social
and scientific attitudes with regard to juvenile status and punishment.250 Second, and very much related to the new social and scientific
trends, the Court is incorporating these objective items into its decisionmaking.251 The majority opinions utilize data from neurological studies

heightened risk taking during this period is likely to be normative, biologically driven, and
inevitable.”).
244. See Laurence Steinberg, A Dual Systems Model of Adolescent Risk-Taking, 52
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOBIOLOGY 216, 217 (2010).
245. L.P. Spear, The Adolescent Brain and the College Drinker: Biological Basis of
Propensity to Use and Misuse Alcohol, J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL & DRUGS, Supp. 14, at 71, 77
(2002) (“[T]he brain of the adolescent is unique and differs from that of younger individuals
and adults in numerous regions, including stressor-sensitive, mesocorticolimbic DA projections that are critical for modulating the perceived value of reinforcing stimuli, including use
of alcohol and other drugs.”).
246. See Theodore A. Slotkin, Nicotine and the Adolescent Brain: Insights from an
Animal Model, 24 NEUROTOXICOLOGY & TERATOLOGY 369, 369 (2002) (“Effects of nicotine on
critical components of reward pathways and circuits involved in learning, memory and mood
are likely to contribute to increased addictive properties and long-term behavioral problems
seen in adolescent smokers.”); see also Jennifer M. Brielmaier et al., Immediate and LongTerm Behavioral Effects of a Single Nicotine Injection in Adolescent and Adult Rats, 29
NEUROTOXICOLOGY & TERATOLOGY 74, 74 (2007) (finding that one dose of nicotine rewards
the brain of an adolescent rat more than the brain of an adult rat).
247. See Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Future Orientation and Delay
Discounting, 80 CHILD. DEV. 28, 29–30 (2009).
248. See, e.g., Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes
Nothing and Everything, in Law and the Brain, 359 PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC. LOND. B. SCI. 1775
(2004).
249. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, New Neuroscience, Old Problems, in Neuroscience
and the Law, 6 CEREBRUM 81 (2004); J.A. Silva, Forensic Psychiatry, Neuroscience, and the
Law, 37 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW 489 (2009).
250. See generally Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48, 68–69 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 382 (1972).
251. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48,
68–69 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 382
(1972).
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and trending legislatures as evidence.252 From these interpretations,
the Supreme Court has indicated a split between youth and adults in
regard to maturity, brain development, decision-making, forethought,
potential for future rehabilitation, and generalized character.253 The
distinction between the two groups reinforces the need to use different
processes and strategies for punishment. The recent Supreme Court rulings generally stand for the proposition that certain extreme punishments are unfit and unconstitutional for juvenile offenders. Additionally, the Court is willing to consider the juvenile offender in a unique way,
suggesting explicitly and implicitly that sentencing determinations
ought to be conducted on an individualized and case-by-case basis. It is
from these procedures and principles that state legislation exhibits bad
policy if it automatically transfers a juvenile offender into criminal court
because this procedure fails to account for the neurological differences,
fails to provide protections for a vulnerable subsection of criminals, and
fails to fulfill any justifiable punishment goals.
III. IDAHO’S MANDATORY JUVENILE TRANSFER LAWS ARE BAD
POLICY
Idaho’s mandatory transfer legislation is bad policy because it violates the rulings and reasoning of the United States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court has held that youth must be analyzed uniquely, according to their situation, and with flexibility based on neurological science that demonstrates their vulnerability.254 The Court concludes automatic transfer of juveniles violates Due Process and mandatory sentences of these offenders are unconstitutional.255 Because of these rulings, the Idaho transfer statute is bad policy because it refuses to judge
each juvenile individually, fails to address the differences between juvenile and adult brain development, and denies the offender a chance to
rehabilitate.

252. See generally Marty Beyer, Immaturity, Culpability & Competency in Juveniles: A Case Study of 17 Cases, 15 CRIM. JUST. 27 (2000).
253. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 70–71 (noting juveniles make “ill-considered actions
and decisions” and “are less likely to take a possible punishment into consideration when
making decisions.”).
254. See generally Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48, 68–69 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
255. See generally Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48, 68–69 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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A. Idaho’s Mandatory Juvenile Transfer Laws Violate Supreme Court
Rulings
The Supreme Court has considered and decided upon the sentencing of juveniles. As previously mentioned, three Supreme Court cases
highlighted the imposition of serious sentences upon juvenile offenders,
and restricted the gravity of the judicial decisions. Roper ruled that a
court violates the Eighth Amendment if it imposes the death sentence
on a minor.256 Graham then ruled that it is unconstitutional to impose a
life sentence upon a juvenile without the opportunity for parole for nonhomicide crimes.257 Finally, and most recently, Miller held that a mandatory life sentence without the possibility for parole violates the Eighth
Amendment if it is imposed upon a minor.258 In each Supreme Court
case, the majority opinion took issue with extreme penalties imposed
upon minors.259 However, under the present Idaho transfer statute,
there is no protection in place that avoids such penalties. In particular,
an Appendix in Graham highlighted Idaho Code § 20-509 as a piece of
legislation that allows for life sentences without parole for non-homicide
juvenile offenders.260 Without saying more, the Court demonstrated that
its ruling invalidated the current Idaho legislation, insofar as the statute allows for precisely the sentence that the Court found to violate the
Eighth Amendment.261
The Idaho Code is structured to provide several apparent safeguards in the juvenile transfer process. One such safeguard is the age
listed in the juvenile waiver statute, Idaho Code § 20-508. There, it explicitly states that fourteen is the lowest threshold for an offender who
is alleged to have committed any act that “would be a crime if committed by an adult.”262 However, in its current form, this age threshold is
simply one of four ways in which a minor can be transferred into criminal court. Surprisingly, what appears to be an age requirement is instead a variation on an otherwise unrestrictive statute. The statutory
language allows the juvenile court to waive jurisdiction of a minor if he
or she is “alleged to have committed any of the crimes enumerated in
section 20-509, Idaho Code; or . . . alleged to have committed an act other than those enumerated in section 20-509, Idaho Code after the child
became fourteen years of age which would be a crime if committed by an
adult.”263 Thus, the minimum age requirement in Idaho applies only to

256. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 551.
257. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 80.
258. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2455.
259. See generally id.; Graham, 560 U.S. at 80; Roper, 543 U.S. at 551.
260. Graham, 560 U.S. at 82 (“Appendix”).
261. See id. at 82–84 (Appendix I: Jurisdictions that permit life without parole for
juvenile nonhomicide offenders).
262. IDAHO CODE § 20-508(1)(b) (2016).
263. IDAHO CODE § 20-508(1)(a)–(b) ( 2016) (emphasis added).
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non-serious offenses, while any allegations of serious offenses proceed
without restrictions.
The combination of serious offenses with the absence of age restrictions is a modern amendment in the Idaho legislation. In fact, the
previous legislation (under the Idaho Code § 16-1806) allowed a court to
waive jurisdiction only if the minor was at least fourteen years of age.264
In 1995, the Idaho legislature renumbered the statute and amended the
requirements for transfer.265 Once effective on October 1,266 Idaho allowed for the transfer of any minors, regardless of age, so long as they
were charged with a serious offense.267
While the Supreme Court has imposed additional restrictions upon
the sentencing of minors within the last twenty years, Idaho has
amended its legislation to allow fewer restrictions for these determinations. The state has not incorporated the Supreme Court rulings or reasoning into its legislation, and continues to allow for the imposition of
harsh sentences upon juveniles. The state of Idaho allows sentences
without the possibility of parole.268 Idaho also allows for the infliction of
the death penalty upon its citizens.269 Without explicit language in its
statutes, Idaho’s present legislation allows these extreme sentences for
minors tried in criminal court.
Although the Idaho adult criminal court system is unlikely to contradict the Supreme Court by sentencing a juvenile to life without parole or the death penalty, the current Idaho legislation is bad policy in
principle. The Supreme Court suggests in its recent rulings that a state
ought to provide protections for its juvenile offenders. The rationale for
this protection argument comes from the differences between juvenile
and adult offenders. The statutes in Missouri (where Roper originated),
Florida (where Graham originated), Arkansas, and Alabama (where
Miller cases originated) all lacked protections for minor offenders.270 The
respective state statutes did not proactively and explicitly sentence juveniles to death or life without the possibility for parole. The statutes
instead lacked any meaningful protective provisions.

264. See IDAHO CODE § 16-1806 (1994) (current version at IDAHO CODE § 20-508
(2016)).
265. See id.; see also IDAHO CODE § 20-508 (2016).
266. 1995 Idaho Sess. Laws 106.
267. IDAHO CODE § 20-509 (2016).
268. See id. (explaining that a judge may alter a juveniles sentence, but providing no
explicit restrictions on the sentencing otherwise).
269. See IDAHO CODE § 19-2705 (2016) (explaining the procedural requirements
when a person is sentenced to death).
270. See Ioana Tchoukleva, Children Are Different: Bridging the Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality Post Miller v. Alabama, 4 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 92, 97 (2013).
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Without particular language to set age limits, require hearings, or
restrict sentences on juvenile offenders, the Idaho transfer statute is no
different than the invalidated statutes from Missouri, Florida, Arkansas, and Alabama. In the most crucial aspect, the statutes from all these
states focused entirely on the crime committed. With a presumption
that certain crimes were notably heinous or gruesome, the statutes resulted in a threshold, beyond which an offender of any age would be penalized to the maximum extent allowed by law. The supposition is
therefore one where a minor can be treated as an adult in procedure and
sentencing if he or she has committed an adult crime.
However, the Supreme Court invalidated these crime-based statutes precisely because they lacked consideration of the individual offender and failed to impose limitations and restrictions on the procedures and sentencing. Thus, in this way, the current Idaho transfer
statute is bad policy insofar as it does not require individual consideration in every case. Although the age limitation and hearing requirement
remain in one respect, these protections do not apply if a fourteen-yearold commits murder or is found with marijuana within one thousand
feet of a school.271 Although we trust the district judges in adult criminal
court, it is bad policy to force a minor into a complicated system that
utilizes unrestricted sentencing procedures when the juvenile court is a
legitimate alternative. This is particularly troublesome due to its automatic nature. To conform with the principles and rationale of the recent
Supreme Court cases, Idaho ought to consider the crime, defense, character, and potential sentence in relation to the individual juvenile offender and not simply to the alleged crime. The Idaho legislation ought
to protect minors through the process by imposing restrictions on age
and punishment.
B. Idaho’s Legislation Ignores Scientific Information Regarding
Juveniles
The recent rulings by the Supreme Court do not simply condemn
harsh sentences imposed on minors. The Court also speaks of the importance in integrating objective factors into the individual analysis of
an offender.272 According to the Court, an analysis into a juvenile offender must therefore be two-fold: First, the offender should be judged
under an objective array of factors and information, including but not
limited to scientific tests, data, and analyses that speak to the maturity,
understanding, cognitive development, and rehabilitation potential of

271. See IDAHO CODE § 20-509(a), (i) (2016).
272. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2470 (2012) (explaining the importance of “objective indicia”); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61 (2010) (beginning an
analysis by speaking of the objective factors); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 567 (2005)
(explaining the role that objective indicators have played in the national consensus and thus
the Eighth Amendment analysis).
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the offender. Second, these objective factors ought to apply uniquely to
the minor who is subject to judicial proceedings.273
Idaho’s transfer statute fails to incorporate the neurological factors
that make juveniles different than adults. By focusing only on the crime,
the automatic transfer provision disregards the neurological deficiencies
in minors that alter their behavior. Additionally, because the statute
lacks the general protections for procedure and sentencing, there is
more reason to require consideration of the psychological defenses for a
minor.
Specifically, Idaho’s statute is bad policy for two reasons: First, it
treats a juvenile like an adult for the crime committed, even though scientific research proves that juveniles are unlike adults. Second, it does
not allow for a defense in which the juvenile can express this research
as to the causes, predispositions, and consequences of the crime and its
punishment.
First, for all the scientific research regarding the differences in a
juvenile brain, the Roper court narrowed the distinctions to conclude
juveniles lack the maturity and responsibility of adults, make illconsidered decisions, are more vulnerable to pressure, and are more easily manipulated.274 Roper and Graham determined the differences to be
so significant that it would be wrong to equate the acts of an adult with
the acts of a minor.275 Portraying the information this way reverses the
foundation of the Idaho automatic transfer statute. The Supreme Court
is using neurological and behavioral studies to show extreme biological
differences, then deciding that crimes of a minor must be treated differently than crimes of an adult. The Idaho legislation is using action as its
foundation, so that the same heinous crimes require the same procedure
and sentencing potential, for minors and adults. Idaho’s position is bad
policy because it fails to consider the research that undercuts the notion
that ‘the crimes are the same.’ The Supreme Court, in focusing on the
differences between underdeveloped and developed brain cognition,
sought to express how in fact the crimes are not the same, even for an
identical result. If a juvenile commits murder, then the biological components of that decision and action is different than if an adult commits
murder. The juvenile lacks an understanding of the action, cannot comprehend the consequences, is vulnerable to the social pressure, has a
tendency to take risks, and could learn from the mistake. Thus, the act
of murder by a fourteen-year-old is different than murder by a thirty273.

See, e.g., Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2470; Graham, 560 U.S. at 61; Roper, 543 U.S. at

274.
275.

Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70.
Id. at 572–73; see also Graham, 560 U.S. at 68–70.

567.
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four-year-old. Idaho’s automatic transfer statute ignores this notion, and
fails to integrate it into the current provision, which focuses on the likeness of actions and consequences.
Second, Idaho’s statute is bad policy because it does not allow for a
juvenile to defend his or her actions by way of these neurological differences. After the charge, there is no method through which the offender
can introduce information of biological differences. The harshness of the
automatic transfer is seen through this waiver of juvenile jurisdiction.
Not only does the juvenile court not consider the individual offender, but
there is no place for essential scientific evidence until the juvenile is in
adult criminal court.
Idaho’s automatic transfer statute disregards the overwhelming
scientific research, as well as the Supreme Court cases that depend on
these objective facts. When an individual over the age of fourteen is
charged with a specific serious crime, that minor is automatically transferred into the adult criminal court system.276 Consequently, the alleged
offender is subject to the same trial procedures and sentences of adult
offenders. Although one could argue that this provides additional legal
and due process protection otherwise lacking in the juvenile court system, the real result is an equalization. In the Idaho system, certain offenders are necessarily treated as though they were adults because of
the charge. The possible sentences raise questions about the procedure.
As previously mentioned, Idaho legislation has no restrictions or safeguards to prevent harsh sentences. Even more, the equalization of certain serious juvenile offenders with their adult counterparts contradicts
the Supreme Court rulings. The Supreme Court in Roper, Graham, and
Miller focused on the differences between juveniles and adults. Scientific
research has proven the differences in brain formation, cognition, and
behavior. To allow for the automatic treatment of a minor as an adult is
not only unconstitutional, but illogical. The Idaho transfer statute presupposes that the seriousness of a crime is indicative of the culpability
of the offender. However, the underdeveloped brain in youth that encourages risky behavior and limits understanding, as well as the potential for rehabilitation and maturity, indicates precisely the opposite –
seriousness of a crime fails to indicate the character and culpability of
the offender, and lacks any implication into the potential for treatment
and rehabilitation. In fact, to equate the crime with the adult criminal
system, the Idaho automatic transfer statute supposes that the juvenile
either acted like an adult or deserves punishment like an adult. The
neuro-scientific research portrays a youth action as entirely different
than an adult action, even if the consequence is the same. Additionally,
a punishment’s potential deterrent effect is lost on a minor who generally makes risky choices, does not consider future implications, and cannot comprehend potential impacts. Therefore, not only is the Idaho automatic transfer statute unconstitutional in its contradicting the recent
276.
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Supreme Court cases, but also insofar as it ignores biological realities
that make it illogical and absent of any legitimate benefit.
C. Recommendations for Change
To improve the treatment and handling of juveniles in the Idaho
judicial system, I recommend that the legislation eliminate its automatic transfer laws. In their place, the Idaho legislation ought to spell out
particularized procedural rules for an initial hearing in which the juvenile is granted counsel, an ability to answer allegations, and an individualized process. Protective safeguards ought to be instituted regarding
the age and competency of the minor offender. Finally, the judge for the
initial hearing ought to have experience with juveniles and incorporate
suggestions as to the proper treatment of the offenders.
Holding a mandatory hearing is beneficial to the juvenile offenders
because it provides a structure for proper due process protections. The
hearing also enables a reflection as to the character of the offender and
his or her individualized position. Considering the individual prior to a
transfer embodies the reasoning of the Supreme Court insofar as it
treats adults and juveniles differently. Juvenile offenders should not be
subject to extreme sentences, and after the Supreme Court rulings in
Roper, Graham, and Miller, imposition of such sentences would be unconstitutional as a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Idaho should
explicitly delineate these sentence limitations in its legislation. The effect would be two-fold: First, it would eliminate any temptation of judges in adult criminal court to equate the crime directly with the sentence.
Second, it would highlight the distinct treatment of young offenders and
represent an act of structured mercy and practicality.
The elimination of automatic transfer does not rule out any and all
potential transfers. In fact, if Idaho finds it necessary to proceed against
a juvenile in adult criminal court, it could still allow for this option.
Most concerning is in the automation of the process. A cost-benefit analysis can assist in this matter—the benefits of efficiency and ease of
transfer do not outweigh the potential cruel treatment, imposition of
extreme sentences, neglect for neuroscience, and requirement for differentiation. The automatic transfer also cannot provide a noticeably superior process than non-automatic transfer. Thus, the consequence of automatic transfer does not outweigh the detrimental effects—and especially, the potential effects—of such a policy.
Conversely, a hearing requirement would impose a predictable and
structured procedure for juvenile offenders. An argument can be made
that mandatory and automatic consequences for specified crimes provide the most predictability. Broadly speaking, however, the automation
for only several enumerated offenses produces a variation in responses.
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Furthermore, the evidence to support each allegation is likely to vary,
and therefore qualifies the automation on the subjective decision of the
prosecuting attorney. Additionally, when the Supreme Court sought legitimacy and predictability in the case of the death penalty, it explicitly
barred the use of mandatory sentences according to delineated offenses.
There, the Court demanded an individualized consideration regarding
the character of the crime and of the offender. Arbitrariness is not
solved with automation.
The hearing requirement and abandonment of the automatic transfer would also shift the focus of juvenile law back to rehabilitation and
individualization. Idaho has the potential to progress beyond the historical failings and inadequacies of the juvenile court system. The origins of
the juvenile court sought rehabilitation for young and malleable offenders. Abuse in the mid-twentieth century ushered in the role of transfer.
But this protection has since overrun the solution and its proportionality. Now, similar due process violations in the mandatory transfer require a further compromise. Elimination of the automatic transfer and
imposition of a hearing requirement allows for this compromise—
between the offense and the offender, the past and the future, the consequence and the cause, the biology and the judiciary, the punishment
and the rehabilitation. An intentional incorporation of juvenile rights
and protections advances justice and sensibility, while not substantially
impeding the imposition of a penalty.
IV. CONCLUSION
Idaho’s automatic transfer of juvenile offenders to adult criminal
court is bad policy, and fails to provide Constitutional due process protections for youth. Insofar as the Idaho legislation mandates an automatic transfer for particular crimes, it does not follow the United States
Supreme Court holding and rationale in Kent, which requires a procedure of individualized consideration with respect to the offender and the
crime. Furthermore, the automatic transfer disregards rehabilitative
principles, protective safeguards, and scientific evidence that demonstrates the differences between juvenile and adult neurology and behavior. Finally, the benefits of transferring a juvenile automatically and
without an individualized hearing do not outweigh the Constitutional,
procedural, and philosophical costs of the procedure.
Beck Roan

